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Abstract	  
Why do countries engage in democracy promotion around the world? Why is the 
principle component of U.S. foreign policy abroad assistance with democratization? One 
answer is the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) (also known as “Liberal Peace”).  
Accordingly, DPT states, as its basic tenant, democracies behave differently with one 
another than they do non-democracies, especially in relation to military altercations.   
Why are some countries more successful than others in promoting democratic 
ideals around the world?  In order to partly explain this question, I examine American 
and Turkish foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East from a comparative perspective.  
The United States of America and the Republic of Turkey both reflect the basic tenant of 
the Democratic Peace Theory in their foreign policies.  Each maintains policies that 
promote the establishment of democracies and the perpetuation of democratic ideals in 
the Middle East region.  Differences in policies are observable when consideration is 
placed on the principles of inclusion and exclusion in negotiating, nation building, and 
the promotion of national interests in foreign affairs.  The United States maintains 
bureaucratic rigidity while Turkey exemplifies an open policy when negotiating with 
interested parties.  An analysis of nuclear proliferation in Iran, the two invasions of Iraq 
since 1990, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals an increase and advancement of 
Turkey’s influence in the spread of democracy in the Middle East and a corresponding 
decline in that of the U.S.  This approach might have strengthened Turkish strategic 
leverage in the region with comparatively  greater (than the United States) ability to 
promote democratic ideals in the Middle East region through the continued building of 
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partnerships and a dedication to stability of the region, the balancing of internal political 
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Section	  I:	  Introduction	  
	  
The creation of democracies is of interest to democratic states around the world, 
which subscribe to key principles of the Democratic Peace Theory.  There exists a basic 
ideology that democracies behave differently to one another than non-democratic states 
(Layne, 1994).  Beyond basic ideologies there also exist real-world implications for 
Democratic Peace Theory.  For example, democratic states such as the United States and 
Turkey have brokered peace, participated in armed conflict, nurtured young democracies, 
and established foreign policies around Democratic Peace Theory.  
 The Democratic Peace Theory is used to explain the relatively minute amount of 
armed conflicts between democratic states around the world as compared to those who 
are ruled by dictators or aristocratic hierarchies. However, there is a significant amount of 
war and unrest in non-democratic states.  For example, the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq have been fought for nearly a decade in some cases.  Afghanistan was ruled by the 
Taliban – a repressive regime made up of Islamic extremists – and Iraq was ruled by a 
dictator who was renowned for his brutality and lack of commitment to the safety of his 
people.   These wars were fought against ruling tyrannical regimes under the guise of 
removing terrorist threats, disarming a potential nuclear Iraq, and creating a safer and 
more peaceful region.  Democratic Peace Theory has been the foundation of U.S. foreign 
policy during the post-Cold War era (Layne, 1994).  This model has existed because 
democracy has long been viewed as a key to stability.  Stability is the absence of violence 
or a threat of violence against others either domestically or internationally as a method of 
foreign engagement.  It is also used to succinctly describe a peaceful existence among 
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peoples living within politically defined borders of the state in question. It is paramount 
that the reader understands that discourse and disagreement are not excluded under this 
definition of stability, but that stability and non-stability are dependent upon political 
transitions and the use of force domestically and abroad.  For example, although the U.S. 
Congress is polarized and non-functioning in the eyes of many Americans, the U.S. is 
viewed as stable due to the holding of elections and a respect for the democratic voice of 
the people.  It is also important to recognize the limitations of DPT when explaining the 
foreign policy of the United States and Turkey.  For example, the U.S. never criticized 
the Mubarak regime of Egypt before civil unrest and a demand of the people for a regime 
change in 2011 even though his rule was indisputably autocratic and repressive.  The 
answer is because of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington.  As DPT is 
used to explain many actions throughout this analysis, it is important to note that its 
power of explanation is limited, just as all theories are in application.       
This proclivity toward stability has led to somewhat loose interpretations as to 
what democracy can look like in these fostered democratic states.  As Kennan put it in his 
essay Morality and Foreign Policy, “there are parts of the world where the main 
requirement of American security is not an unnatural imitation of the American model 
but sheer stability, and this last is not always assured by a government of what appears to 
be popular acclaim” (Kennan, 1985).  However, there has been increased pressure under 
recent United States administrations and the Department of State’s defined foreign policy 
to actively pursue the U.S. model for democratic reform.  This pressure has come with 
arguably mixed results.       
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 While the United States has taken a somewhat aggressive role in democracy-
building across the Middle East region over the course of the last two decades, the 
Republic of Turkey has fostered democratization more cautiously with hesitation to 
become involved in powder keg foreign relations.  The Turkish government has become 
an advocate for stabilization at home while keeping a multilateral approach to policy 
abroad – that is, Turkey rarely takes action without international support and a consensus 
at home (Robins, 2004).  This multilateral approach and remarkable leverage which 
Turkey wields has come from the unique geographic location of the global power as well 
as its vested interests in the West, particularly the United States, the Middle East (its 
home region), and the East including Russia.  This is because stability leads to positive 
relationships among neighbors.  Authoritarian regimes do not possess the same promise 
as guarantors of stability as they did under such successful endeavors as the Roman 
Empire.  However, democracies have proven less successful in a climate in which 
religious fundamentalism tends to dominate the political landscape as is the case in the 
Middle East region.  The United States and Turkey – the models of democracy for this 
argument – are secular states in which there is a line of separation of church and state.  
Although political conservatives in the United States and the current Turkish Prime 
Minister are followers of a particular religion, tolerance and peaceful engagement are 
valued above religious ideologies in the political realm.  Often, generally anti-Western 
ideologues are sometimes swept into power in open elections in countries of the Arab 
World. Kennan (1985) argued for individual interests in a country to be useful for the 
perpetuation of stability, even if those where at sometimes out of line with official 
recognized policies.  This is the case in Turkey as the official policy is one of hesitation 
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and preservation of relationships for the national interest above all else, but individual 
political parties and their members frequently advocate for swift action to propagate their 
interests whether they be religious, cultural, or otherwise. (Ozel and Ozcan, 2011).    
Kennan said, “What is being said here [relating to the promotion of democracy and 
human rights] does not relate to the reactions of individual Americans, of private 
organizations in this country, or of the media, to the situations in question. All these may 
think and say what they like” (Kennan, 1985).  To expand upon this quote, it is believed 
by Kennan (1985) that individuals may think or believe what they like.  However, it is 
when these principles of quick action are elevated to the policy level that they become 
problematic.     
 With different approaches to the implementation of democracy promotion relating 
to the Democratic Peace Theory, it is the purpose of this paper to focus on issues of 
inclusive or exclusive principles in foreign policy interactions in the Middle East region.  
Placing aside arguments for and against Democratic Peace Theory (although there are 
voluminous arguments for either side), the primary investigation will be ideas of 
inclusive negotiations including all parties involved or an exclusion of groups due to 
foreign policy principles.  Examples of exclusion and inclusion will be examined later as 
specific situations are examined.  I hypothesize that increased inclusion and willingness 
to bring affected parties to the table will serve to improve the image, reputation, and 
impact of the mediating nation in the region, thus providing for a more effective position 
from which democracy promotion may proceed.    
 Although many nation states could be used, the United States of America and the 
Republic of Turkey are used due to notable differences, varying regional perceptions, and 
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contemporary interest among academics and politicians in each state as the U.S. is a key 
world player and Turkey moves to become a member of the European Union.  
Additionally, Turkey is a strategic ally of the United States, the only mature democracy 
in the Muslim world, and is expanding regional influence toward that of a major power.  
Three situations will be analyzed with specific focus on each nation’s response to a 
situation in the Middle East region.  These will include: nuclear proliferation in Iran, the 
invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  There are differing 
approaches of each nation to these dynamic and varied crises.  This paper will focus on 
the relational outcome with regional stakeholders and through what lens Turkey and the 
United States are viewed in the world’s eye.  While each nation state has been involved 
in the multitude of these conflicts, they enjoy different perceptive attitudes in the region -
- attitudes toward the U.S. declining and Turkey’s reputation on the rise.  While Turkey 
has become a preferred source of intervention and mediation the United States has come 
to be viewed as a meddler and outside agitator (Robins, 2004).   
 Regardless of whether inclusivity or exclusivity are used, the path to a democratic 
Middle East is, indeed, and difficult one to create.  There have been numerous failures of 
parliamentary models such as those under British and French League of Nations in the 
early twentieth century (Avineri, 2002).  These were followed quickly with fascism and 
Marxism in the mid twentieth century until there was a systematic reversion to traditional 
Islamic ideals.  Also of interest is that all Middle Eastern states (sans Turkey and Iran) 
were colonies until the 1950s and 60s and, even once independence was achieve, they 
were ruled by dictators.   These ideals leave little room for democratic ideals with the 
prospects of movement toward democratization on their own highly unlikely.   
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 This return to Islamic roots has led to the characterization of the Middle East as 
homogenous by western powers.  This is not supported by empirical research and based 
more in ignorance than fact.  There are rural and urban areas, those rich with natural 
resources and those, which are all but devoid of such resources, and there are theocracies 
and military dictatorships (Avineri, 2002).  In short, there exists a unique situation in 
each country and, therefore, a blanket foreign policy may not be the best route on a path 
of encouraging peace in the region.  These specific principles and their implementation 
will be vetted later as the reactions and policy views evolve and are put into action across 
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Section II: Iran Nuclear Proliferation and Weaponization 
 
 The viewing of any international news source will reveal the fact that Iran has 
worked toward uranium enrichment.  There exists a lengthy debate on whether the 
enrichment activities are for peaceful purposes or for the development of a nuclear 
warhead or other weapon development of a nuclear type.  While Iran has asserted that it 
is developing such technologies for peaceful purposes, it has not been open to inspections 
of nuclear research facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as 
mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Shenna, 2010).  This has led 
to a suspicion of the Iranian regime by Western powers, which is not completely baseless 
as Iran has acted in such a manner for no less than eighteen years (Shenna, 2010).  While 
there are serious concerns from Western powers, there are serious concerns and interests 
in ongoing negotiations among regional states also have a vested interest as the stability 
of the region is at stake.  The vested interest in stability is why the United States and 
Turkey along with other parties have participated heavily in finding an answer to the 
Iranian nuclear question. 
 The United States has maintained an interest section at the Swiss embassy in 
Tehran since 1980 after the United States embassy was closed after the 1979 hostage 
crisis in which Iranian students seized a number of U.S. workers in a highly publicized 
hostage situation.  Since that time, the relationship between Tehran and Washington has 
been viewed as strained by the most optimistic among political analysts and outright 
hostile by more realistic reviewers (Bahgat, 2007).  Since that time, until the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by the United States, Washington’s foreign 
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policy for the Middle East included a counterbalancing of monetary and military power 
between Iran and Iraq.  As the Iran-Iraq War had resulted in enormous casualties for both 
sides of the conflict, the United States counted on the mutual threat of each country to the 
other to keep any hostilities or power grabs in the region to a relative minimum.  
 This policy of maintaining military balance between Iran and Iraq remained in 
effect until President George W.  Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney greatly 
accelerated the idea of forced democratization into the Middle East region following the 
terrorist attacks in the cities of New York and Washington in the United States on 
September 11, 2001.  At this time, the de facto policy of the U.S. Government became 
one of preemptive strikes of purported enemy states or nations which harbored terrorists 
or organizations that are “black listed” or viewed as unfavorable or unfriendly by the U.S. 
government.  At this time, Iran became a legitimate target for the United States because it 
is not democratic, it is governed by Islamic fundamentalists, and aids radical Arab groups 
many of which the U.S. has labeled terrorist organizations (Cannistraro, 2007).  This 
view by Iranians that their nation had become a legitimate target was fortified by the 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.  This, coupled with increased saber 
rattling in Washington, would lead any reasonable government to see that its similarities 
and isolation from the aggressor could and well may lead to an invasion of its sovereign 
territory for the purposes of a regime change.  
 Facing increased military pressures in the region from a combination of Western 
powers, Iran offered to go to the table to discuss its uranium enrichment programs, the 
prospects of nuclear development, and its ties to so-called terrorist organizations.  
However, with the lack of success faced by the U.S. military in Afghanistan to quell 
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insurgency and unite the nation, and the increase of sectarian violence in Iraq that was, by 
some media accounts, leading to a potential civil war. Iran saw the inability of the United 
States to achieve definitive military success on either front and talks quickly broke down 
(Bahgat, 2007).   
 After talks broke down, broad-based threats, accusatory statements, and military 
exercises increased from Washington and Tehran.  The situation was further intensified 
by pressures for an armed engagement from neoconservative ideologues, including Vice 
President Cheney, in the U.S. and the lack of commitment to cooperation with Western 
powers by President Ahmadinejad.  The U.S. military was ordered to be ready to respond 
with force from any Iranian threat within twelve hours.  The situation was further 
aggravated by Israeli lobbying for a United States bombing campaign to prevent the 
weaponization of nuclear material by Iran (Cannistraro, 2007).   
 With the drum of war beating a familiar tune in the eyes of the world, The U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. John Bolton, began calling for a U.N. bombing of 
Iran nuclear sites before weaponization could occur.  Further escalation occurred when 
Vice President Cheney spoke from the deck of the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. 
John C. Stennis, in 2007 saying, “With two carrier strike groups in the [Persian] Gulf, 
we’re sending messages to friends and adversaries alike” (Cannistraro, 2007). The United 
States’ commitment to escalation and exclusion coupled with its intimate relationship 
with Israel has further isolated Iran and made the prospects of cooperation from Tehran a 
distant thought at the time.   
 With neither side willing to come to the negotiation table, Western powers have 
flatly refused to allow Iran the ability to develop uranium enrichment for peaceful 
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purposes.  This is called the “zero enrichment demand,” and the U.S. government keeps 
this demand as a matter of policy even though enrichment for peaceful purposes, 
including energy production, is allowed under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
(Shenna, 2010).  These interferences in the Iranian energy market and international trade 
are viewed as unreasonable in the eyes of Tehran and have led to the current situation.  
 In 2010, Turkey and Brazil successfully negotiated with Iran for an exchange of 
low enriched Uranium for a smaller amount of radioactive material for its medical 
research reactor. The deal was hailed around the world as a major breakthrough and was 
praised as a potential solution (Reinl, 2010).  However, the United States and four other 
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council scrubbed the deal and called for 
additional sanctions against Iran calling the reached deal a “sideshow.” A representative 
from the Foreign Relations Council was quoted as saying, “The central thrust of U.S. 
diplomacy has been that Iran is not trustworthy, that Iranian intentions regarding 
weaponization are clear and the deal isn’t as good as the Turks and the Brazilians were 
making it out to be” (Reinl, 2010).  With Western engagement at a dead-end due to 
exclusivity, the extinguishing of diplomatic relations some three decades ago, and the 
constant use of inflammatory language from both Iran and the U.S., there appears to be 
no viable U.S. resolution to the Iran question. The United States continues to offer no 
solution except for increased sanctions or a military strike – both of which have shown to 
further isolate the Iranian government and provide justification for Iran to completely 
withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty causing the loss of what little control 
of their actions remains (Shenna, 2010).  This is the case even though a constructive 
engagement with Iran, including open talks and negotiations regarding nuclear 
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proliferation and the harboring and supporting of Islamic extremist organization which 
are black listed by the U.S. government as  terrorist organizations, could serve as a 
vehicle to successfully defuse situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the West 
Bank (Bahgat, 2007).    
 While the United States has dead-ended most of its bargaining power with Tehran 
over its nuclear ambitions – peaceful or otherwise – Turkey has come to the forefront as a 
regional partner with Iran.  Perhaps it is the fact that both states are Muslim (although 
Turkey is Sunni and Iran is Shi’ite), or that Prime Minister Erdogan was the first person 
to congratulate President Ahmadinejad on his election victory in 2009. Turkey is a key 
economic partner for Iran, In addition, Turkey is very powerful and a major power broker 
in the region.  Iran does not have many allies in the region because of its Shi’ite regime.  
As a result, Turkey remains a great hope in the successful diplomatic solution for Iran 
(Shenna, 2010). 
 Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey has made it abundantly clear that he wants a 
diplomatic relationship with Tehran in which sanctions are not present.  This may be due 
largely to the Turkish economy.  Iran is Turkey’s fifth largest trading partner and its 
largest neighbor in the region (Shenna, 2010).  Turkey sits directly to the west of Iran and 
the two nations share a long border.  Therefore, the remaining stabilization of Iran is of 
extreme security importance to Turkey as it emerges as a regional and world power.        
 Ankara has been absolutely clear that it opposes the development of a nuclear 
weapon by Tehran.  Even though Iran has not initiated a regional conflict in over two 
centuries, Turkish officials remain hesitant about the enrichment of weapons grade 
Uranium (Bahgat, 2007).  Turkey has been accused of wanting both a strong economic 
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relationship with Iran, protection from nuclear threats from the United States and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even going so far as to host U.S. manned 
defensive missiles in the south of the country (Bahgat, 2007).  This contradiction in 
policy is a result of tension in Turkish domestic politics.  The Kemalist establishment 
consisting of the military, secularists, and nationalists fear Turkey will become the 
second Iran with increased religious influence and a disregard for human rights.  
However, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) consists of liberals, center-
rights, and religious leaders who want to maintain economic ties with Iran even though 
each state has starkly different religious viewpoints (Sunni vs. Shi’ite).  Still, somehow, 
there manages to be positive diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tehran as well as 
Ankara and Washington (Shenna, 2010).   
 Regardless of internal politics and interest groups, Turkey has managed to 
successfully negotiate a deal with Iran in the past (scrapped by UNSC) and can, likely, do 
the same in the future.  The work of Turkey to negotiate Iran’s admission into the NPT as 
a non-nuclear-state-party such as Brazil or Japan, and, thus, allow for the enrichment of 
uranium for peaceful purposes such as energy production, would allow for the dispelling 
of anti-Western sentiments and, possibly, a better diplomatic relationship between the 
West and Iran (Shenna, 2010).   
 In this situation, Turkey holds the key the United States simply will not.  This is 
due to the Turkish commitment to preserving relationships with regional partners in order 
to grow the economy at home while maintaining positive interactions abroad.  The United 
States has forced itself into the region on military exercises and destabilized the nations 
which it occupies.  This has led to a distrust of the American government by many of the 
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nations of the Middle East and unwillingness to strike deals and work out problems.  In 
this long and complicated situation, there remains a hope for a diplomatic solution, but 
the one who has been at the table has the opportunity to accomplish the task at hand 
while the one that has refused to bargain, give, or compromise is left waiting on the next 
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Section III: Iraq and Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield and Iraqi Freedom 
 
 Iraq has been a source of conflict in the Middle East for the past two decades.  
Beginning with Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and continuing with 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, two major conflicts have brought world military force 
to the region countering the regime of Saddam Hussein.  This led to the toppling of the 
Hussein regime after the 2003 invasion led by United States military forces.  The Turkish 
and U.S. responses were varied in each conflict.  It will be best for this analysis to 
separate the two for further investigation.  
 Media reports about the Gulf War -- as Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
were and are collectively referred to in colloquium – indentified the military operations 
as “Bush’s War.”  However, published accounts suggest Bush wanted to threaten war but 
not actually participate in military engagement (Holland, 1999).  This is demonstrative of 
a changing U.S. foreign policy of increased flexing of U.S. military muscle to accomplish 
foreign interests. This emerged from the Ronald Reagan administration and the building 
up of U.S. military might following the end of the Cold War.  Furthermore, Bush may not 
have wanted an actual military engagement in the end, but early decisions favored an 
active engagement with the Iraqis following their invasion of Kuwait.  These actions 
included the deployment of U.S. troops to the region, the taking of an offensive posture, 
and refusing to negotiate with Saddam Hussein until Iraqi forces had vacated the 
sovereign territory of Kuwait.  This refusal to negotiate is known as “bureaucratic 
rigidity” throughout academia (Holland, 1999). This dogmatic commitment to an issue, 
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which is a non-starter in negotiations, served to derail pre-war negotiations in this case as 
well as many other regional events as mentioned previously and that will be revisited. 
 In the run up to the air and ground operations from military forces, the United 
States had enjoyed a fifteen year policy of not jeopardizing U.S.-Iraqi relations by 
avoiding participation in inter-Arab conflicts (Holland, 1999).  Instead the U.S. had 
played an offshore balancing power role by such actions as balancing Iraq and Iran 
against one another to maintain peace in the region by infusing each country with money, 
military hardware, and communication equipment.  Due to this official U.S. policy, 
Washington and Baghdad had enjoyed a conciliatory relationship which served to bolster 
the stability of the region and the U.S. oil market.  This is demonstrated by 
communications of April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, with the Iraqi government in 
which she said, “I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship…not it the 
spirit of confrontation regarding your intentions [with deploying Iraqi troops to the 
Kuwaiti border]”  (Holland, 1999).   
 As a result of its permanent role on the U.N. Security Council and its 
humanitarian and economic aid initiatives with many of the nations involved, the United 
States took a leading and disproportionate role in coordinating the global response when 
Iraq invaded Kuwaiti territory compared to other member states of the United Nations.  
The United States was willing to assume such a role as its geo-economic, strategic, and 
commercial interests in the region were directly threatened by a destabilization of the 
area by the Iraqi invasion (Holland, 1999).  While the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 
moved for a United Nations Security Council resolution, U.S. bureaucratic forces at 
home slowed the response.  This safeguard, which causes U.S. civil and military 
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leadership to coordinate on military operations, was and is in place to prevent U.S. 
politicians from going to war on a whim or for politically advantageous reasons.  This 
system worked in 1990 and resulted in a stronger United States response to the Iraqi-
Kuwaiti conflict as part of a multinational force.  At the end of the conflict Saddam 
Hussein remained in power, but was removed from Kuwait.  It was counted as a success 
from the world community and U.S. leadership.  The region remained relatively stable 
and the U.S. withdrew.   
 Turkey’s response to the impending invasion of Iraqi territory in 1990 was one of 
aiding the U.S. military action and imposing an embargo on Iraq with the closure of the 
Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline.  This came at a great cost to the Turkish government as Iraq 
was one of Turkey’s top trading partners (Makovsky, 1999).  Much like the United 
States, the Iraqi conflict was a symptom of a changing foreign policy shift in a 
government facing increasing pressures from interest groups at home and a need to exert 
regional influence in the region.  This action, although logical by a policy of foreign 
activism, caught many Turkish experts by surprise, as it was the first interventionist 
action taken by Turkey in a long time.  However, the indications where there as Turkey 
doubled military expenditures to over 6 billion U.S. dollars annually during the decade 
that encapsulated the 1990 Gulf War.  This strengthening came at a time when every 
other NATO nation with the exception of Greece decreased military budgets by at least 
twenty-five percent (Makovsky, 1999).   
 There exist three theories as to why Ankara departed from a traditional foreign 
policy of insularism into one of taboo adventurism into international and regional affairs.  
Two major issues that explain the Turkish action on this issue include the desire of the 
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Turkish regime to occupy once Turkish-controlled Northern provinces.  This is 
highlighted by Prime Minister Ozal’s remarks which included, “This time we want to be 
at the table, not on the menu” (Makovsky, 1999).  This is derived from Turkish concerns 
that occurred at the dissolution of the former British and French colonial influences at 
which point Turkey was left without the traditional territories which had been controlled 
into antiquity.  The second issue was the influence of the United States and NATO 
membership.  The invasion was spearheaded by U.S. military forces and Turkey was in 
need of U.S. support economically through cash and subsidized loans (Makovsky, 1999).   
Thirdly, Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK) (terrorist organization as defined by Turkey) 
safe havens were located in Northern Iraq.  This led to the desire of Turkey to have some 
influence over the shaping of Iraq especially in the North.  Perhaps the most plausible 
explanation is some combination of the three ideas enumerated above which would lead 
to an expression of Turkey as an emerging power with increased military strength at 
home and abroad especially after the influence of Cold War enemy, Russia, was gone and 
its influence as a stabilizing power in the region (Makovsky, 1999).   
 There is no question that the Turkish joining of coalition forces was a break in 
long-standing foreign policy which had served Turkey well in keeping domestic peace by 
focusing on the development of a market-based economy at home as well as stabilizing 
the political climate among ethnic factions domestically.  However, the joining of the 
coalition did not seem to be a singular occurrence.  This is supported by President Ozal’s 
declaration at a press conference a year after Turkish involvement in military action 
within Iraq.  He declared Turkey should “leave its former passive and hesitant policies 
and engage in active foreign policy” (Makovsky, 1999).  These actions signaled a 
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departure, maybe permanently, from the policies which had led to the cultivation of a 
democracy in the Arab world.  This action was also an indication that Turkey was no 
longer interested in the development of regional stability but rather increasing 
partnerships with Western allies such as European superpowers and the United States.  
The Turks began to realize a need for extended partnerships in trade and protection as the 
dynamic within the region began to shift.   
 However, when the U.S. began preparation for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Turkey was no longer a “yes man” for its most influential Western ally.  Public opinion 
within Turkey had shifted and concerns about refugees, Kurdish autonomy, and concerns 
about the legitimacy of American action.  These concerns led to a harder bargain for U.S. 
officials when they approached the Turkish government for support for military 
operations focusing on a regime change in Baghdad.  A price tag for involvement set at 
20 to 24 billion U.S. dollars in loans and debt forgiveness was discussed (MacMillan, 
2005).  However, negotiations stalled pending elaboration of concerns expressed above 
and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) blocked the usage of the Turkish 
border for an invasion of Iraq across its northern border. 
 Laying U.S. influence aside, Turkish officials chose to take a position more inline 
with most of Europe as it opposed an American invasion of a U.N. member nation 
without a resolution by the UNSC.  Without such a resolution, Turkey viewed military 
action in Iraq as illegal.  President Sezer affirmed there would be no use of Turkish forces 
without a UNSC resolution.  This was further supported by public opinion among the 
Turkish people being against a U.S. invasion (MacMillan, 2005).   
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 Further concerns about Kurds in Turkey and Iraq were a source of major 
hesitation with Turkey.  If there was a splitting of ethnic factions after the toppling of the 
Hussein regime, it was extremely likely that the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq would 
become autonomous and lead to a secession of the densely Kurdish Southeastern region 
of Turkey (MacMillan, 2005).  This would be a nightmare scenario for Turkey as it 
would lead to problems domestically that would destabilize the national economy and the 
development of the maturing democracy.  Terrorism was deeply engrained in the minds 
of Turkish leaders and not because the U.S. had waged a war on terror.  Instead, it was 
caused by the classification of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist 
organization until there was a unilateral ceasefire in 2002 (MacMillan, 2005).  With an 
influx of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, peace could be lost and the terrorist PKK could be 
revitalized and cause further problems including violence in the homeland.  Even though 
the GNA would approve the use of Turkish troops in Iraq in November 2003, by that 
time the Iraqi National Council had rejected the use of Turkish soldiers in the Northern 
region of the country.    
 The hesitation of the Turkish government to commit to military action in Iraq 
signaled a shift back to the traditional foreign policy, which had been abandoned in the 
Gulf War in 1990.  This policy was one of placing nationalistic interest and domestic 
development above the interest of foreign entities.  This is exemplified by the bargaining 
for tens of billions of dollars for loans for economic development and fortification of the 
Turkish economy, which would outweigh negative implications caused by a foreign 
military intervention.  This return to the nurturing of its democratic society has led to the 
further development of the stature of Turkey in the region. 
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 The invasion of Iraq by U.S. military forces in 2003 under the guise of forcing 
compliance with international nuclear inspectors was later dismissed as a farce due to the 
lack of weapons of mass destruction.  There is now wide consensus among political 
scholars that the original intent was nation building and the elimination of Saddam 
Hussein.  However, faced with this reality, President George W. Bush said, “It wasn’t a 
mistake to go into Iraq.  It was the right decision to make…We are in Iraq today because 
our goal has always been more than the removal of a brutal dictator; it is to leave a free 
and democratic Iraq in its place” (Layne, 2007).  This was not a reaction to the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001 in the United States. This was a continuation of a U.S. global 
democratization plan in overdrive in the last decade of the twentieth century. The 
American government had attempted democratization in Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo with little success (Layne, 2007).  This spanned both Republican and 
Democratic leaders in the White House eliminating accusations that hyper-
democratization had gone beyond neoconservative principle and become more of an 
American value.  With the evolution of the American democracy toward one of 
expansion and propagation, there came an increased investment in the principles of the 
Democratic Peace Theory (Byman, 2003).   
 However, lessons were not learned by leaders in Washington in the almost a half-
dozen attempts at forming democracies around the globe in the last decade.  Although the 
toppling of Hussein’s regime came quickly and relatively easily, it became increasingly 
apparent that the United States had not adequately accounted for how the situation in Iraq 
would play out (Byman, 2003).  While there was not planning, there was a clearly 
defined goal of success: leaving a functioning democracy in Iraq (Feaver, 2011).  The 
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mission would be exponentially hard due to the lack of criteria being met for Iraq to 
become a functioning democratic entity.  Each of these criteria was developed by 
transitionologists and includes: a modern, market-based economy, absence of ethnic 
divisions, a vibrant civil society, and a culture hospitable to democratic development 
(Layne, 2007).  Although Iraq is relatively wealthy due to tillable land and massive 
amounts of fossil fuels and has a large educated class, which was developed before 
Hussein ascended to power, Chris Sanders, a specialist on the Middle East, states, “There 
isn’t a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy” (Byman, 2003).  A cursory reading of this 
quote would suggest that neither Turkish nor U.S. approaches would be successful if 
there is no field in which to plant the seeds of democracy.  However, this concern is 
absolved once the Turkish approach leads to cooperation and the building of a society 
which models Turkey and uses its principles as a model.  This is achieved through a 
positive view of Iraqis in relation to the Turkish society.    
 After the ouster of Hussein, the U.S. attention turned to an increasing insurgent 
threat and a rise in sectarian violence, which threatened the establishment of a democracy 
in Iraq.  As a result, President Bush announced a surge of an additional thirty thousand 
U.S. troops for an accelerated training and transition mission on January 10, 2007 
(Feaver, 2011).  This was initiated by the belief that the mission could still be successful 
if the United States would stay the course and bear the burden of a lengthy mission while 
the democracy grew roots and began to mature (Byman, 2003).  Iraq needed massive U.S. 
assistance due to interference by neighbors including Iran and a lack of democratic 
perspective by the native population (Byman, 2003).  There was also a fear that Iraq 
would descend into civil war if the U.S. withdrew due to an ever-increasing insurgent 
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activity and pattern of sectarian violence.  A U.S. withdrawal would lead to a 
destabilization and possible fragmentation of Iraq, which would be acquired by larger 
regional powers.  If this occurred, the U.S. would have won the war but have lost the 
peace (Layne, 2007). While if the U.S. stayed the course, democracy could give factions 
a voice with Shi’a opposition leaders being controlled to prevent the majority from 
trampling the rights of the minorities’ rights (Byman, 2003).  
 To view the military invasion of Iraq as an isolated event is to take an overly 
simplistic view of U.S. interference in the Middle East.  Officials in the Bush 
administration have spoken as to the larger worldview of those in power.  Richard Perle, 
a top strategist, said, “Saddam’s replacement by a decent Iraqi regime would open the 
way to a far more stable and peaceful region.”  This, when coupled by James Woosley’s 
(former CIA Director) words, “[A regime change in Iraq] could be a golden opportunity 
to begin to change the face of the Arab world.”  It is highly important that all key 
components of DPT must be better understood before it can be effectively implemented. 
Some actors seem to have forgotten a major component of the Democratic Peace Theory 
is a transitional period.  The establishment of a democracy is accompanied by an 
immediate destabilization that exists until the democracy matures – a period of years in 
most cases (Byman, 2003).  This is prolonged in states in which ethnic divisions exist.  
Examples of this division and destabilization are shown in Azerbaijan-Armenia, Georgia, 
and Tajikstan (Byman, 2003).   
 Instead of persistent military involvement to force “modernization” of the Middle 
East, the United States would be well served by using the immense economic leverage 
the vast American economy can wield with regional partners to influence the region 
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(Layne, 2007).  This would lead to a more civilian-controlled bureaucratic response as 
opposed to a military-dominated one.  This process would be more gradual, slow, and 
allow for a more controlled transition in the Middle East region.  Operation Iraqi 
Freedom tried to establish a democracy in Iraq, but we don’t know what the final chapter 
of this war will be.  At least, perhaps, we can say that a path to a possible democratization 
has been established, but it is hard to predict what will happen in Iran in the near future.  
However, it is only functioning under an immense foreign military presence in order to 
control sectarian violence and insurgency.  This is not the Iraq Washington had 
envisioned before the decision was made to invade the nation and topple the Hussein 
regime in 2003.  It has become an experiment in unintended consequences due to the 
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Section IV: The Israeli Question 
 
 There is perhaps no more pertinent question when considering peace and 
cooperation in the Middle East than that of Israel and, particularly, the Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship.  The creating of the nation of Israel in the Middle East following the 
conclusion of World War II has led to over a half century of tension, negotiation, and 
international interest and influence in the region.  With the majority of the Arab world 
viewing Israel through varying lenses from acceptance, to tolerance, to outright hostility, 
the two nations of focus in this analysis are left in a unique position of maintaining 
regional influence and credibility while working with the government in Jerusalem and 
the Palestinian Authority to achieve a working and lasting peace initiative.   
 Turkey has long maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and has been a broker 
of peace in the Israeli-Palestinian question.  This can be tracked to nearly the genesis of 
the nation of Israel.  Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize the legitimacy 
of Israel in 1949 (Walker, 2006).  While Israel is a predominately Jewish state and most 
Turkish people having a religious orientation toward Islam, each are secular democracies 
who find extreme value in their respective relationships with the American government.  
While the value of the Turkish-Israeli relationship has often been secret or obscured by 
Israel and Turkey as a method of preserving the interests of each nation in the region, it 
has survived tumultuous times to become what it is today.  
 Beginning with the Cold War and its effect on relationships among nations in the 
Arab world, Turkey was under the umbrella of the NATO alliance and took a de facto 
positive view of relations with the ruling government in Jerusalem.  It is of value to note 
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that while this was a favorable relationship, Ankara never gave Jerusalem ally status.  
The United States played a dominant role in the relational development of the day as the 
superpower challenging the Soviet Union and providing military security for allied states 
in the region.  The Turkish-Israeli relationship was enjoyed by each side until the 1970s.   
 After twenty years of U.S. influences Turkish-Israeli influenced cordial 
interaction, Turkey condemned Israel’s actions against Palestinians and began a period of 
voting with Arab nations in the United Nations (Walker, 2006).  This was part of an 
effort by Turkey to strengthen its Arab ties as it moved to assert itself toward a regional 
power player.  However, in traditional Turkish fashion, Ankara never fully severed ties 
with Jerusalem due to the interests of trade and the preservation of regional relationships.  
Diplomatic ties were simply moved from the front window to the back room by 
Jerusalem and Ankara.  Diplomatic exchanges continued in secret for two decades before 
the run up to the Gulf War at the turn of the decade in 1990 (Walker, 2006).   
 Beginning in 1990, both Israel and Turkey re-subscribed to the principle of 
“shared otherness” that both countries shared (Walker, 2006).  Shared otherness is the 
idea that Israeli and Turkey are united by their common realities which include being 
viewed as secular democracies in a region dominated by totalitarian Islamic states.  This 
led to the opening of embassies in each nation as a show of a rapidly strengthening 
diplomatic relationship that was now on full display for all to see in the Arab world.  In 
addition to this “common sense of otherness in the region (Walker, 2006),” each also 
shared a common threat perception from Islamic extremists, terrorist organizations, and 
regional neighbors (Walker, 2006).  Since the 1991 Madrid Conference, Turkey has 
eagerly accepted its role as a neutral third party negotiator and mediator in the Israeli-
	   	  Collins	  28	  
Palestinian peace process.  Such an opportunity was afforded due to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and the ruling Israeli government sharing a trust and general respect for 
the leadership in Ankara (Altunisik & Cuhadar, 2010).   
 Facing increasing pressure from Israel and the United States to take a position of 
“democratic role model” model in the Arab world, Turkey has continued a role of 
mediator despite tensions caused by the balancing of Hamas-Palestinian interests.  This 
has led to tense exchanges between Ankara and Jerusalem as the latter has labeled Hamas 
a terrorist organization (Walker, 2006).  Even though there have been numerous hiccups -
- one of the most interesting being the popular election of devout Muslim Erdogan as 
Turkey’s Prime Minister in 2002 – the process to finding a Palestinian-Israeli peace 
agreement has proceeded with Turkey at the helm.  Turkey attempted to meet with the 
elected leadership of the PA, but was stopped by Israel because many of the elected 
officials’ ties were to Hamas.   
 As Erdogan has swept to power in Turkey and continues to gain immense 
popularity among its citizenry, he has insisted that Ankara cannot be a bystander in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as violence has once again become the normal circumstance 
(Walker, 2006).  Prime Minister Erdogan has reiterated time and again that the successful 
reaching of a peace agreement between the PA and Jerusalem is the key to deeper 
relationships with Ankara.  Erdogan’s insistence in involvement in negotiations is at odds 
with public opinion at home as the Turkish population strongly favors Palestine.  Even as 
Turkish officials become increasingly involved in a mediating role between Israel and 
Palestine, domestic actions by Turkish civilians have complicated the issue (Altunisik & 
Cuhadar, 2010).  This is best exemplified by the interception of a Turkish humanitarian 
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aid flotilla, which set sail to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and the West Bank, which 
was intercepted by the Israeli navy.  During the halting of the blockade-runners, the 
Israeli military killed nine Turkish civilians leading to Turkish public outcry at home 
(Walker, 2006).  Despite complications, Erdogan’s Turkey has continued the active 
seeking of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 American relations, much like Turkish ones, with Israel have seen distant, cool 
times and close, almost intimate ones.  However, unlike Turkey, the United States seems 
to have reached the peak of its influence in ongoing peace negotiations with Israel and 
Palestine.  As Palestinian trust of the U.S. government has declined so has the ability of 
the Americans to serve as third party mediators (Zunes, 2001).   
 Beginning with the establishment of the Israeli state at the conclusion of World 
War II, U.S. Presidents have pledged unqualified support for the Jewish nation of six 
million that sits halfway across the globe.  Israel is not a regional partner to the U.S. as it 
is with Turkey.  It is instead an anchor, a democratic state in a sea of dictatorship and 
authoritarianism that dominates the Arab world.  It is important to note that the 
assumption by the majority of American people that a treaty between the U.S. and Israel 
exists is false.  There is not formal declaration of partnership between Washington and 
Jerusalem (Lewis, 1999).  Instead, there is a major Jewish influence and donor base 
involved in American politics.  When this is coupled with the Christian right’s Biblical 
view of a need for Jewish control of the Holy Land, it is then easy to deduce why 
American public opinion and, indeed, public policy so strongly favors this otherwise 
inconsequential nation half a world away.  This is an evolved position of public policy. 
By looking at the strength of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, today, one might draw the 
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reasonable conclusion that this is how it has always been.  Of course, this would be the 
simple answer, and simple answers are generally misguided, misinformed, or wrong.   
 The 1950s and 1960s saw an American government, which strongly desired Arab-
Israeli peace and displayed policies, which favored a third party role in mediation.  
Indeed, no U.S. President would receive an Israeli Ambassador in Washington until 
Lyndon Baines Johnson occupied the White House (Lewis, 1999).  This cool and distant 
relationship was the diplomatic norm until the 1960s began to fade into the 1970s.  
 1967 saw a United States that was ready to become more involved in the United 
Nations peacekeeping mission in Israel (Lewis, 1999).  By the time the Yom Kippur War 
occurred in 1973, the United States was beginning to deepen diplomatic relations with 
Jerusalem. Providing the carrot of security in a hostile Arab World, the U.S. began to 
leverage the Israelis into territory withdrawals and negotiations with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO).   This provided an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to 
demonstrate its ability as third party negotiator.  However, this opportunity was quickly 
sunk when the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, precluded negotiations with the 
PLO in 1975 as part of his Memo of Understanding (Lewis, 1999). 
 This exclusion of negotiation with the PLO continued until 1988 when the U.S. 
finally came to the table with the PLO in exchange for a commitment to seek peace with 
Israel.  This set into motion an ever-increasing U.S. role in the peace process.  President 
George H.W. Bush laid the groundwork for further strengthening and President Clinton 
hosted the famous Arafat-Rabin handshake at the U.S. Executive Mansion (Lewis, 1999).  
This is seen as the peak of U.S. success in the peace process.   
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 In 1996, U.S. involvement became more intense when the PLO and Israel 
relationship became a violent one with increased suicide bombings (Lewis, 1999).  As 
Ariel Sharon ascended to the leadership of the Israeli government, the United States 
reinforced its commitment to providing security for Israel from its Arab enemies.  This 
was the beginning of the end for U.S. viability in the peace process.  While the U.S. has 
committed to protection of Israel, the backing of Sharon’s government endangers Israel 
and is counter to the policy established by the U.S. government.  This, when viewed in 
the scope of Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton calling UNSC resolutions 
calling for peace and establishing specific withdrawal criterion invalid – giving 
Palestinians virtually no negotiating power --, can be judged as a one hundred eighty 
degree reversal of the policy of Washington related to the peace process (Zunes, 2001).  
Further degradation to negotiating power has been achieved by the U.S. military 
engagement – often described as a “raping” in Arab media – in Iraq (Ben-Meir, 2009).  
You can see this cannot be blamed on neoconservative American politicians as members 
of the U.S. Democratic Party tend to do, but it is an American policy, generally embraced 
by both parties at the time action was taken.  This is highlighted by both Democratic and 
Republican controlled Congresses refusing to tie Israeli humanitarian and military aid to 
adherence to international law, human rights standards, and the making of peace (Zunes, 
2001).  
 As a result of this lack of commitment to the advancement of the human condition 
on behalf of the U.S. government, leaders in Washington have abandoned years of peace 
and peacemaking for support of Israeli forces to occupy portions of the West Bank and 
Gaza for settlement (Zunes, 2001).  This view, shared by many states in the Arab world 
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and others around the globe, has led to the lost of the respect of the United States 
negotiating position in the eyes of Palestinians who see the American government as a 
nation married to Israel and its policies.  This is shown by the failure of the U.S. 
government to recognize the elected leadership of the PA due to most of the officials’ ties 
being to Hamas.     
 The American position and opportunity has not completely evaporated.  President 
Obama has a chance to revive American respect in the region.  However, he must be 
willing to take an active role with all sides.  However, this could be hard when one 
considers this means recognizing Hamas – a group labeled as a terrorist organization by 
the U.S. government – as legitimate enough so as to negotiate.  Above all, the current 
U.S. President cannot coddle Israel as previous administrations have done (Ben-Meir, 
2009).  However, if there is even an appearance of favoritism toward Israel, the American 
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Section V: Conclusions 
 
 The United States and Turkey have reacted differently to each situation described 
in the preceding pages.  Each nation has achieved specifically different results.  However, 
there are thematic elements and results that can be discerned.  The trend in Middle East 
relations is one of a degrading of respect for the United States and a growing distrust of 
the American government as seen in Figure one below and demonstrated in the May 17, 
2011 report of the Pew Research Institute entitled Arab Spring Fails to Improve U.S. 
Image (Arab spring fails, 2011).  This distrust is a direct result of the way U.S. 
involvement is handled when crises arise or are ongoing in the Middle East region.   
 
Figure 1: Views of the United States 
 
Pew Research Center collected data March 21 – April 26, 2011.   For each category n≥825 and margin of 
error is between 3% and 5%.  Information collected through face to face interviews.  Graphic courtesy of 
Pew Research Center. 
 
 Turkey, on the other hand, has seen a growing reputation in the region as a “go 
to” nation in the event of a regional crisis.  Perhaps the most important reason for this is 
Erdogan’s willingness to break lockstep with Washington.  This is exemplified in the 
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situations described in the preceding pages.  This Arab democracy has taken a leadership 
role in the region while keeping domestic interests and national issues at the forefront of 
policy decisions.  Turkey’s favorability in the region has soared and is at high levels, 
currently.  This is shown in polls of the Arab world regarding Turkey and its leader, 
Prime Minister Erdogan.  These marks are shown in Figures 2 and 3 as published by the 
Pew Research Center in June 2011 (“On eve of,” 2011).   
 
Figure 2: Confidence in Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey 
 
Graphic courtesy of Pew Research Center.  Number of participants for each nation is greater than 750 
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Figure 3: Turkish Favorability Among Selected Nations 
 
Graphic courtesy of Pew Research Center.  Number of participants for each nation is greater than 750 




 For each nation, it is important to note that neither nation created the situation 
they are currently in overnight.  Contemporary ideologies and policies in the Middle East 
are dependent upon the evolution of thought and action that has taken place since the 
Cold War.  Relationships formed during this period have formed the basic groundwork 
for the issues and relationships that are observable in the Arab World, today.   
 The United States has a rigid foreign policy that is based on key demands.  This is 
seen time and again throughout this review including: a zero enrichment policy regarding 
Iran’s nuclear development strategy, a “for us or against us” policy in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a threatening posture assumed by the U.S. 
military, a flat out refusal to negotiate with Saddam Hussein until Iraqi forces had 
vacated Kuwait, a refusal to negotiate on weapons inspectors in Iraq in 2003, a full scale 
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military assault to topple Saddam Hussein the same year, unqualified support for Israel 
regardless of human rights record or violations of international law, and a refusal to 
negotiate with groups which have been blacklisted as terrorist organizations.  This policy 
has been the genesis for the lack of direct negotiation between Tehran and Washington 
regarding nuclear development in the region, two invasions of Iraq over a decade period, 
and the breakdown of the American role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  In short, 
the dogmatic principles of the U.S. government to make certain issues a prerequisite for 
negotiation has cost American dollars, American lives, and, most importantly, the 
American reputation among several Arab states.   
 As the U.S. takes on democracy promotion in the region, having established two 
fledgling, volatile and highly unpredictable democracies (in transition) in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there exist real questions as to whether democracy promoting strategies 
works in the manner the U.S. has attempted.  If it does not, the U.S. foreign policy needs 
to be revisited and American democracy promotion policies will be re-evaluated.  While 
mature democracies tend to subscribe to the basic tenant of non-violence against other 
democracies as described in the Democratic Peace Theory, there is no account for a 
young democracy.   When a regime is forcibly removed, nations are temporarily thrown 
into a state of chaos due to a sudden upheaval in governance.  This leads to the 
establishment of a new government often assembled hastily.   The situation is further 
complicated when two or more traditionally ethnically divided populations occupy the 
same nation – as is the case in many Arab nations.   
 The severe impediment to democratic success in the Middle East is rooted in 
geography and ideology.  Unlike Turkey, which enjoys a position straddling two 
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continents and a Muslim heritage, the United States is located half a world away and 
contains a majority Christian population.   Turkey simply has a better footing on which to 
begin than the American government.  While the U.S. and Turkey both look out for 
national interest in foreign policy, Turkey’s concerns are, to some extent, the region’s 
concerns while U.S. involvement is generally viewed as meddling and interference.   
 This, coupled with a hesitant, cautious, calculated, and overtly nationalistic 
foreign and domestic policies of Turkey, has provided an opportunity for Turkey to take a 
trusted leadership role in the Middle East.  This is demonstrated in Ankara’s preservation 
of a working relationship with Tehran, a limited role in the Gulf War, minimal to no 
involvement in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 except for the preservation of national 
interests, and the growing commitment to and involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks.  Turkey has evolved to take an international role more readily than its 
traditional policies once allowed, but these are generally only after they have invited to 
do so by directly involved parties.   
 This commitment to the preservation of domestic stability and the promotion of 
regional calm has led to Turkey becoming a much more effective promoter of peace and 
democratic values in the region.  Just as individuals are more likely to listen to those they 
have come to know and respect, nations desire to enter into relationships with nations 
who have demonstrated a commitment to clearly defined values.  Even when vast cultural 
divisions have existed as in the case of Israel and Turkey or when there have been severe 
national security and economic concerns as in the case with relations with Iran, Turkey 
has prevailed as a figure of respect and modeling in the region.  Turkey has become the 
	   	  Collins	  38	  
shining example that a nation can have productive relationships with the West, Middle 
East, and East that benefit all economically and otherwise.     
 Using the current state of affairs for the United States and Turkey as comparative 
examples, it is clear that a flexible foreign policy, a commitment to negotiation above all 
else, and cautious, deliberate action have served the Republic of Turkey much better than 
the policies of bureaucratic rigidity have served the United States of America.  As the 
U.S. works to rebuild its reputation in the Arab World, Turkey is enjoying the fruits of 
regional partnerships, domestic stability, and international trade.  As a result of these 
varying outcomes, Turkey now serves as a regional role model for democracy and a 
beacon of light by which democracy can be shone into the Middle East.  As it turns out, 
you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar or, as in this case, you build more 
stable democracies and climates suitable to democracy with inclusion rather than 
exclusion. 
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